

OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC THINKING OF BOHDAN KHMELNYTSKY AND THE OTHER COSSACK COLONELS DURING THE YEARS 1648-1651

SUMMARY

The dissertation consists of Introduction, 3 Chapters, Conclusion and Appendix. The Introduction discusses the subject, objectives and importance of the research. After that a review of the sources and literature used in the research is provided. The main body of the research is structured chronologically. Given that the dissertation is focused on four years (1648-1651), each individual year of Cossack military art is presented.

Chapter I focuses on the events of 1648 (founding of the Cossack-Tatar alliance, the battles of Zhovti Vody, Korsun, Konstantynow, Pyliavtsi; the siege of Lviv nad Zamosc, and the withdrawal of the Cossack-Tatar army to the east). Chapter II discusses the events of 1649-1650 (unsuccessful attempts to sign a permanent peace treaty, first clashes in Volyn, the siege of Zbaraz, the battles of Lojew (I) and Zboriv, as well as the Cossack-Tatar troops' Moldavian expedition). Final Chapter III is concerned with the events of 1651 (the winter-spring campaign of Crown Field Hetman Marcin Kalinowsky in Podolia, the battles of Berestechko, Lojew (II), the Kyiv-Bila Tserkva campaign and the signing of the Treaty of Bila Tserkva, which finalized the first stage of the Uprising). All the findings of this dissertation are summarised in the Conclusion. Attachments are included in the Appendix (tactical sketches, maps, schemes etc).

The main purpose of this research was to demonstrate the evolution of the operational and strategic thinking of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the other Cossack colonels, as well as to analyse their successes and mistakes during 1648-1651. Since the actions of the Ukrainian and Polish sides were interdependent, the research paid a lot of attention to the analogous Polish matters as well. I also stress that all the previous Cossack uprisings started with minor clashes with the Crown Army, whereas Bohdan Khmelnytsky's uprising quickly outgrew the commander himself and destroyed the structural and social order that existed in Ukraine prior to 1648.

Additionally, the reasons behind the great Cossack-Tatar victories during the first years of the Uprising of Bohdan Khmelnytsky were outlined, they were: 1. The power of the allied forces and the genius of Cossack-Tatar commanders; 2. The weakness of the Crown Army and its Hetmans; 3. The combination of the two above outlined factors. I answer the questions posed in the Conclusion of this dissertation. In the dissertation, I also assess the military art of the Cossack commanders over the span of the whole Uprising and demonstrate why the great victories of 1648-1651, as well as the whole complex of socio-economic-political changes that took place on the territory of modern Ukraine since the mid 17th century ended in a *de facto* defeat.